**How social gap in non-cognitive skills predict inequalities in education – an exploratory study**

Between March 2018 and March 2020, we visited 71 school groups (classes) in 10 Hungarian schools to measure time, risk, social and competitive preferences (the so-called non-cognitive skills) of 1276 secondary school students using incentivized laboratory experimental tasks. Our research aims to look at how the different preferences associate with school performance on the individual as well as on the group level, and also to see whether there is any heterogeneity (gender and social status) in these associations.

Following Falk et al. (2018), we applied the staircase method to measure time preferences of students, e.g. patience (how much participants discount future payments), or present bias (Laibson, 1997). To test risk preferences, we used the bob-risk elicitation task of Crosetto and Filippin (2013). For testing competitive preferences, we utilized a simple, gender-neutral, real effort task (counting zeros) and used the three-round measure of competition suggested by Niederle and Vesterlund (2007). We applied three different games to test social preferences: the dictator game, the trust game and a simple public good game. We gave out vouchers for the school buffet to incentivize the experiments.

The experiments were anonymous, but using the hash codes provided by the Education Authority, we can link the individual preferences with the individual data from the National Assessment of Basic Competences (NABC) which allows us to see how preferences relate to individual school performance, aspiration and other school characteristics (type of class, curriculum, location, etc.). It also provides us with useful information about the participants’ family background. With the detailed preference map of the students and the additional information on their family background and school performance, we want to study several research questions. For instance, we are interested in the distribution of preferences between and within schools, how family background associates with preferences, the association of past school performance and recent preferences, the mediating power of family between past school performance and preferences. Since we have school-class level data, we can also study if classes with better aggregated social preferences perform better academically. That is, do classes where students are more generous, cooperative and trusting exhibit better academic results?

Some data on the participants:

* 10 schools:
  + 5 in Budapest, 5 in smaller towns
  + 7 Academic Secondary Schools, 3 Vocational Secondary Schools
* 71 school groups (classes):
  + 62 academic classes, 9 vocational classes
* 1276 diák:
  + 8th grade: 41 students; 9th grade: 418 students; 10th grade: 385 students; 11th grade: 336 students; 12th grade: 96 students

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**Research documentation (detailed methodology, descriptive statistics, preliminary results):**

Horn, D., Kiss, H. J., & Lénárd, T. (2020). Economic Preferences in the Classroom – Research Documentation. *SSRN Electronic Journal*. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3615292>

**Literature:**

Crosetto, P., & Filippin, A. (2013). The “bomb” risk elicitation task. *Journal of Risk and Uncertainty*, *47*(1), 31–65. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11166-013-9170-z>

Falk, A., Becker, A., Dohmen, T., Enke, B., Huffman, D., & Sunde, U. (2018). Global Evidence on Economic Preferences. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, *133*(4), 1645–1692. <https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjy013>

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Niederle, M., & Vesterlund, L. (2007). Do Women Shy Away From Competition? Do Men Compete Too Much? *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, *122*(3), 1067–1101. <https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.122.3.1067>